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Trading Spaces: The Changing Role of the
Executive in U.S. Trade Lawmaking
KATHLEEN CLAUSSEN
ABSTRACT
Since the earliest days of the republic, the U.S. executive has wielded
a significant but constitutionally bounded influence on the direction of
U.S. trade law. In the twenty-first century, the growth of free trade
agreements has led to an institutionalization of trade norms that permits
the executive many more spaces for engagement with trading partners. In
addition, other types of quotidian lawmaking extend the power of the
executive in both public and hidden spaces beyond congressional
delegation, even as that power remains substantially bounded by
congressional control. This Article analyzes the dynamics between the
branches that will direct future U.S. trade lawmaking.
INTRODUCTION
The first commercial treaty entered into by the United States began
as a diary entry by John Adams. In 1776, Adams drafted clauses that
would eventually form the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the
United States and France that was signed on February 6, 1778.1 In
addition to provisions that guaranteed mutual protection of vessels and
measures to deal with contraband goods, the treaty featured articles
that governed basic principles of trade between the two countries. 2 The
United States would eventually withdraw from the French treaty in the
* Any views expressed in this Article are those of the author only. I am grateful for
comments from and conversations with colleagues including Fred Aman, Phil Chen,
Yvonne Cripps, Dan Conkle, Diane Desierto, Justin Miller, Elizabeth Trujillo, Arthur
Tsao, and Pierre-Hugues Verdier, and for the editorial support of the IJGLS student staff.
1. Treaty of Alliance Between the United States and His Most Christian Majesty, Fr. -
U.S., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 6 [hereinafter Treaty of Amity and Commerce]. See French
Alliance, French Assistance, and European Diplomacy During the American Revolution,
1778-1782, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, https:/history.state.gov/mileston
es/1776-1783/french-alliance (last visited Feb. 23, 2017).
2. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, supra note 1.
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1790s, but that treaty nevertheless served as the first of a series of
friendly trade and commerce treaties intended to facilitate the
development of the new republic.
Since Adams' time, U.S. commercial and trade treaties have
evolved, along with the world economy, though some of the same trade
law principles that governed Adams' diary-penned treaty have survived.
Most notable in that evolution is the fact that there are no longer any
U.S. trade treaties concluded today. The most recent U.S. trade or
commerce treaty entered into force in 1953.3 Before that, the most
recent U.S. trade treaty was concluded in 1948.4 Since the end of the
Second World War, U.S. foreign trade law took a different turn-or at
least, a different form. No longer was the treaty seen as a suitable
instrument for advancing U.S. trade interests.
Political and legal developments precipitated the use of a new tool in
lieu of the treaty: the "congressional executive agreement" (CEA)-so
named because of the congressional-executive joint process through
which it is made. Trade CEAs, more commonly termed free trade
agreements (FTAs), such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) have revolutionized the U.S. approach to international trade
lawmaking and have played a pivotal role in redefining the balance of
power between Congress and the executive in the area of foreign
commercial matters.
This Article examines U.S. trade lawmaking and the changing role
of the executive in that process. It does so by analyzing the three major
legal tools through which the United States makes trade law: actions at
the World Trade Organization (WTO); trade CEAs; and trade-related
executive communications. I focus on the latter two activities, where the
most interesting questions surrounding the separation of powers arise. I
argue that the congressional-executive tug-of-war on trade law has had
two important effects: (1) it has catalyzed a normative
institutionalization that reaches beyond trade; and (2) it has created
new spaces for executive authority while also strengthening
congressional control over other spaces in U.S. trade lawmaking. These
effects in the transnational lawmaking landscape have been little
studied and little tested. The Trump Administration may change the
latter; this piece seeks to change the former.
Outside the United States, trade lawmaking has traditionally and
logically been a competence of the executive branch. This has been true
3. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Japan-U.S., Apr. 2, 1953, 4
U.S.T. 2063.
4. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, China-U.S., Nov. 29, 1948,
63 Stat. 1392. Certainly, there are many bilateral investment treaties that have entered
into force since that time. Those will be differentiated below.
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since early conceptions of trade in polities that predate the modern
nation-state. Part I of this Article takes a critical look at how the United
States' experience fits into this history. I argue that, as trade has
changed, the trade lawmaking process has adapted to those changes.
U.S. law and policymakers have accommodated new directions in trade
by seeking to create functional instruments that allow the United States
to maintain a leadership role.
Part II of the Article turns to the congressional-executive
agreement, specifically examining its origins and effects. The use of the
CEA to govern U.S. trade interactions has moved through three
important stages to, as of the 2016 presidential election, a fourth stage.
The first, experimental stage of the trade CEA facilitated the U.S.
assent to the multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), the precursor to the WTO. Next, the adolescent phase featured
constitutional challenges to the CEA but ultimately facilitated the
introduction of regional trade blocs. In their mature phase, trade CEAs
have changed the larger international law landscape both with their
regulatory power and their role as norm drivers. Now, at the start of
2017, the future of trade CEAs is once again in question. I maintain
that the interaction between Congress and the executive in the United
States in the next generation of trade lawmaking wil direct the future
form and substance of U.S. contributions to international law. The
power balance characterizing their interaction is also likely to make or
break U.S. success in shaping the international rules that govern the
flow of goods and services.
Part III introduces what I call "quotidian trade lawmaking" by the
executive, which has grown, in part, out of CEAs. Just as the trade
CEAs have built institutions and delegated authority to those
institutions, they have likewise created a managerial role for the
executive that has broadened the range of instruments used in
international trade law. Small, binding, subject-specific contracts that
regulate the flows of goods and services in bilateral arrangements are
negotiated and issued every day by agencies in the executive branch.
These contracts are executed with little congressional scrutiny,
pursuant to delegated authority, and make notable contributions to
international trade flows with a more limited impact on the
development of international trade law.
Finally, this Article picks up where other analyses leave off by
asking what is the effect of the fusion of powers between the branches,
particularly on international trade law. It examines the normative
implications of today's two spheres of transnational engagement on
trade: the plurilateral and the quotidian. To do so, it hones in on the
347
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substance of each and, most importantly, the actors that guide each
through the negotiation and conclusion processes.
I. TRANSNATIONAL TRADE LAW MANAGEMENT
International trade has been a focus of international law since
before the sovereign state became the primary consumer and originator
of international law as we know it today. Copper exchanges in ancient
Sumer dating back to 3000 BC took the form of contract.5 Commercial
interactions among quasi-sovereigns in the era of the Greeks
contributed to the earliest known "international" trade agreements.
Like the major U.S. agreements of today, it was customary among the
ancients to bargain for more than just reduced duties on products that
were traded in the conclusion of those classical agreements. Negotiators
sought to increase power and cooperation across a range of issues. Thus,
from the earliest days, trade-focused agreements regularly addressed
issues beyond the prices of copper or grain, but also areas of executive
province in modern times, such as the range of regulatory freedom. In
this Part, I take up certain formative moments of international trade
law, such as who contributed to its development as well as how the law
formed before the dawn of modern international law and long before the
establishment of the WTO in the twentieth century.
A. Trade Comes to the Executive
Beginning as early as Mesopotamia, trade exchanges became
increasingly formalized. Although they had not yet arrived at a concept
of organized states in free coexistence, the ancients possessed important
elements of international law, including in the area of trade. Foremost
of these were principles of juridical equality and reciprocity of nations
that would later shape the reciprocity of trade among them. These
principles were regularly practiced as a sort of customary international
trade law, despite the lack of a systematized body of law.6
Fourth century Athens and Thessaly negotiated broad nonmilitary
agreements that regulated their trade relations. The Greeks had a
specialized word for international agreements involving mutual
protection of commerce, or that otherwise regulated commercial
relationships, just as CEAs today have become synonymous with trade
5. See WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE: How TRADE SHAPED THE
WORLD 20-21 (2008).
6. See COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT
GREECE AND ROME 60 (1911).
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in the United States.' The Greek trade agreements, in addition to
covering a broad range of areas, frequently provided for the
establishment of neutral tribunals to hear disputes arising out of such
intercourse and to further develop the norms and practices among city-
states.8 Rome likewise entered into commercial and maritime treaties,
largely based on strict reciprocity of treatment, with nations possessing
autonomy and independent personality.9 The commercial arrangements
among city-states and empires were scripted from an early stage by the
rulers, officials, and diplomats of that age.
Following the model of the ancients, later states would develop more
complex agreements to govern their trade relations. In the late
nineteenth century, France, Germany, and Britain negotiated bilateral
trade treaties with each other and across Europe. The long interruption
to the development of liberal trade regimes brought on by World War I
and the Great Depression eventually came to an end to reinvigorate
world trade in the late 1930s. However, it was not until after World War
II that the reconstruction of the world economy would lead to the
conclusion of the international-level or multilateral GATT, the
precursor to the WTO. This transition proved to be a watershed moment
in the movement from bilateral to multilateral trade governance.
Trade lawmaking in the United States accommodated this shift. In
the early days, other than the Adams' model Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation (FCN) treaties negotiated by the executive, foreign
commerce or "trade" lawmaking consisted principally of tariff setting.10
And tariff setting consisted primarily of congressional dictation of a
singular tariff schedule. Hence the language of Article I, Section 8 of the
U.S. Constitution, granting Congress the "Power To lay and collect . . .
Duties . . . [and] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations."" These
two tools, tariffs as set by the Congress and FCN treaties as negotiated
by the executive, were the major trade tools of the early years of the
republic.
7. The Greeks had different kinds of treaties, each of which had a category:
conventions, agreements/compacts, truces, covenants/contracts, and treaties of peace. See
id. at 375-76.
8. Id. at 378.
9. Id. at 114.
10. Lester, Mercurio, and Bartels' history of the modern international trade regime
begins with the tariff truce of 1860 with the Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce; prior to
that time, tariff setting was a principal source of income for many states. See Simon
Lester et al., Introduction to BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE
STUDIES 3 (Simon Lester et al. eds., 2d ed. 2015).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The drafters envisioned the regulation of commerce to
consist of something other than simply laying duties, although that role was limited at
that time.
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The FCN treaty, with its basic reciprocal arrangements, served the
United States' commercial interests for a century and a half.12
Eventually, however, with multilateral institutions on the rise, a
question arose as to what would serve as the vehicle for trade
lawmaking in the new era. Trade agreements required domestic
implementation and the president could not do that alone.13 The result
was a blurry area of shared power assigned in one respect to Congress
and in another to the executive and a doubt about whether the treaty or
some other device could serve U.S. interests. 14 If the regulation of
foreign commerce is primarily for Congress and treaties are primarily
for the executive, how would the government organize its position
regarding a foreign agreement about commerce? The question was
resolved with two important institutional steps: the creation of the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative in the Executive Office of the
president and the implementation of "fast-track"/trade promotion
authority (TPA) procedural rules for Congress and the executive to
develop a congressional-executive trade agreement. I turn to these in
greater detail next.
B. Executive Prerogative or Delegated Authority?
The first institutional change to accommodate shifting planes of
international trade enhanced the executive branch's facility to
participate in the multilateral world trade agenda. In the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, Congress called for the president to appoint a
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations to conduct U.S. trade
negotiations. This move elevated the position of those handling
12. While FCN treaties were the most prominent, they were not the only instrument in
use during this period. For instance, trade reciprocity treaties with Canada and with
Hawaii in the mid-nineteenth century were negotiated and ratified without regard to the
differentiation in constitutional authority. See B.W. Patch, The Tariff Power, CQ
RESEARCHER (May 10, 1945), http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrrel945051000;
see also Oona A- Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the
Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 174-75, 175 n.105 (2009) (describing the agreements
negotiated by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt with congressional blessing).
13. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 250 (2001) (commenting that the President is not a
lawmaker).
14. See id. at 240 (observing that the constitutional text enumerates a variety of
powers bearing on foreign affairs that it delegates to one or the other political branch
"without specifying how the enumerated powers are to be related to one another or
organized into a coherent framework"); see also David Gartner, Foreign Relations,
Strategic Doctrine, and Presidential Power, 63 ALA. L. REV. 499, 500 (2012) (discussing the
"limited text in the Constitution allocating power over foreign affairs between the
branches of government").
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international trade, reflecting the growing importance of trade
negotiations on the world stage.15 The Special Representative was to
lead an interagency trade organization established to make
recommendations to the president. In 1963, President Kennedy created
the Office of the Special Trade Representative (STR) in the Executive
Office of the President, with chief responsibility for U.S. participation in
the multilateral trade negotiations held under the auspices of GATT.16
In the 1970s, Congress substantially expanded the STR's
responsibilities, but also kept tabs on its activities. The Trade Act of
1974 made the STR directly accountable to both the president and
Congress for these and other trade responsibilities and elevated the
Special Trade Representative to cabinet level.17 Executive Order 12188
of 1980 renamed the STR as the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), centralizing U.S. government policy-making
and negotiating functions for international trade.
Each of these institutional maneuvers ostensibly reflected a
congressional interest in enhancing executive authority. Within that
context, the importance of the creation of the USTR was the recognition
from both branches that the multilateral trade stage demanded more
than what was in place at the time, and that additional institution
resided very close to the president within the Executive Office of the
President.
The increased importance of international trade and international
trade law occurred not just in agency creation and restructuring but
also in the continuing debate on internal procedural mechanisms for
designing trade relations. Parallel with the institutional expansion, a
procedural framework then known as "fast track authority" was first
contemplated in the Trade Act of 1974. This framework evolved from
initiatives undertaken by Congress as early as 1890 to enable the
United States to achieve certain policy goals.18
15. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872, (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1801).
16. Exec. Order No. 11,075, 27 Fed. Reg. 473 (Jan. 15, 1963).
17. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. §§ 2101-2497b).
18. The Tariff Act of 1890 was the first domestic legislation to grant the executive a
license to negotiate agreements with foreign countries to reduce tariffs without seeking
congressional approval of the agreements. The 1890 Act gave the president flexibility in
the negotiations he would conduct, but prescribed the relevant duties he could impose. See
Historical Highlights: The McKinley Tariff of 1890, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/fHistoricalHighlight/Detail/36160
(last visited Feb. 23, 2017). Shortly thereafter, the Tariff Act of 1897 authorized the
president to reduce certain import duties for limited periods, though those agreements
would still have required approval by the Senate and by the House. The Revenue Act of
1913 gave President Roosevelt power to negotiate "trade agreements with foreign nations
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In its original conception, "fast track" or "TPA" was a carefully
delineated but reasonably narrow procedural authorization to the
president from the Congress. In general terms, TPA authorizes19 the
president to initiate negotiations for an FTA with a trading partner. 20
TPA also sets out terms of engagement between the Congress and the
executive throughout the negotiation process with the aim of keeping
wherein mutual concessions are made looking toward freer trade relations and further
reciprocal expansion of trade and commerce ..... Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16,
38 Stat. 114, 192 (1913). Still, the agreements had to be "submitted to the Congress of the
United States for ratification or rejection." Id. The McKinley and Roosevelt
administrations negotiated agreements with eight European countries, but these did not
receive congressional approval and never came into effect. Then, in 1934, with the passage
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), Congress granted the executive the
authority to "enter into foreign trade agreements with foreign governments," that is, to
conclude reciprocal tariff-reduction agreements to foster free and fair competition, without
congressional approval. Act to Amend the Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 73-316, §
350(a)(1), 48 Stat. 943, 943 (1934). This qualified executive authority served as a turning
point in the executive's control of trade policy in the United States. See Bruce Ackerman &
David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 803 (1995) (describing
how the president won the constitutional authority to substitute the agreement of both
Houses for the traditional advice and consent of the Senate as an "historical triumph").
While delegating its authority, Congress did not surrender broader trade law-making
authority and oversight. Still, the RTAA changed the U.S. approach to international trade
law-making in ways that would create a permanent adjustment to executive-congressional
collaboration in this area. For a more in-depth historical review, see generally Harold
Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After INS v.
Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. IN'L L. & POL. 1191 (1986) (examining by what devices Congress
seeks to influence and oversee executive branch management of U.S. international trade
policy).
19. I use the term "authorizes," though the language is imprecise. Constitutionally, the
president does not need congressional authorization to enter into negotiations. A better
construction may be to say that Congress authorizes the president to enter into reciprocal
trade agreements.
20. In the original 1974 Act, Congress urged the president "to take all appropriate and
feasible steps within his power . .. to harmonize, reduce, or eliminate ... barriers to (and
other distortions of) international trade." Trade Act of 1974 § 102(a). Congress then
specifically authorized the president to enter into trade agreements for a short-term
period of five years:
Whenever the President determines that any existing duties or other
import restrictions of any foreign country or the United States are
unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United
States and that the purposes of this Act will be promoted thereby, the
President during the 5-year period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this Act, may enter into trade agreements with foreign
countries . . . providing for the harmonization, reduction, or
elimination of such barriers (or other distortions) of providing for the
prohibition of or limitations on the imposition of such barriers (or other
distortions).
Id. §§ 101(a), 102(b).
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Congress apprised of what the President, acting through the USTR,
seeks to propose as well as the terms that are being negotiated.
At the conclusion of a negotiation governed by TPA, the president
presents to Congress an implementing bill for the negotiated CEA
without any opportunity for amendment to the agreement itself.21 The
agreement is subject to a simple majority vote in each house of
Congress, a step which is intended to proceed with some expediency,
leading to the shorthand reference to "fast track." Neither treaty nor
tariff schedule, the agreement occupies a space of its own, though it
retains a treaty-like status once concluded and implemented. 22
21. Although trade is known for its use of CEAs, CEAs have been employed for
agreements in other areas, as well. See, e.g., James J. Varellas, The Constitutional
Political Economy of Free Trade: Reexamining NAFTA-Style Congressional-Executive
Agreements, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 717, 730 (2009) (documenting an "explosion of
congressional-executive agreements" over the last seventy years). A public debate on the
Iran Nuclear Agreement in 2015 was representative of the range of options employed by
Congress and the executive. See, e.g., James Fallows, The Real Test of the Iran Deal, THE
ATLANTIC (Jul. 28, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/internationallarchive/2015/0 7 /the-
iran-debate-moves-on/399713/; NCC Staff, Key Items in the Constitutional Debate Over
Congress, Obama and Iran, NAT'L CONSTITUTION CTR. (Mar. 11, 2015), httpi/blog.constitutio
neenter.org/05/03/key-items-in-the-constitutional-debate-over-congress-obama-and-iran/.
22. See Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE
L.J. 664, 677-80 (1944); Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54
YALE L.J. 616, 627-64 (1945); Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of
National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 237 (1945). See also Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties'
End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117
YALE L.J. 1236 (2008); Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional
Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2001); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality
of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001). For a discussion of
the implications of Article I, 10, cl. 3 in which the founders acknowledged the existence of
agreements or compacts other than treaties, see generally Charles Cheney Hyde,
Agreements of the United States Other Than Treaties, 17 GREEN BAG 229 (1905); G.
Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85
VA. L. REV. 1 (1999). The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 303 notes:
Since any agreement concluded as a Congressional-Executive
agreement could also be concluded by treaty . . . either method may be
used in many cases. The prevailing view is that the Congressional-
Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty
method in every instance. Which procedure should be used is a
political judgment, made in the first instance by the President, subject
to the possibility that the Senate might refuse to consider a joint
resolution of Congress to approve an agreement, insisting that the
President submit the agreement as a treaty.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 cmt. e (Am. Law Inst. 1987)
But see Chantal Thomas, Constitutional Change and International Government, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (2000) (arguing that the use of congressional-executive agreement has
led to the construction of an "international branch" of constitutional concern).
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Thus, in a significant and meaningful way, it was the transnational
trade trends that precipitated a new instrument of trade law within the
United States--one that carefully balances the congressional and
executive interests in a delicate compromise.
II. BIRTH OF THE MEGAREGIONAL AGREEMENT & EMPOWERMENT OF THE
EXECUTIVE
When the trade CEA first came on the scene, its purpose was largely
instrumental. On the one hand, the United States was positioned to
become an economic leader on the world stage. On the other hand, world
trade was increasingly multilateral, in part due to U.S. influence. For
the United States to participate in future rounds and agreements, it
needed an appropriate international law instrument. The trade CEA
grew out of the history set out above, blending congressional and
executive prerogatives and ultimately empowering the executive to
engage in significant policymaking in the trade space. The functional
solution in the late 1940s and the decades that followed opened the door
to large-scale regional agreements beginning in the 1990s.
Today, when we refer to "trade agreements," we typically mean to
refer to these large-scale trade CEAs (FTAs) concluded between two or
more trading partners that cover a variety of subject matters. Then, as
now, such agreements eliminating tariff barriers and opening new
markets have remained at the center of U.S. trade relations, but they
have also changed by expanding the engagement among trading
partners into new sectors and new enforcement mechanisms. These
agreements go much farther than John Adams' diary. The large-scale
agreements, also with dispute settlement mechanisms that leave open
the possibility for additional normative development, are not just about
trade in the traditional sense. Although the 1778 treaty with France
was not limited to commerce (per the title, it also reflected the two
states' friendship), the latest generation of trade agreements includes
elaborate provisions governing some areas typically considered to be
domestic issues such as labor and environment. This is true not just for
U.S. trade agreements, but also for some European and Asia-Pacific
trade agreements as well.23
The last twenty years of U.S. trade lawmaking have been
characterized by the growth of regional and bilateral trade
23. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, E.U.-Viet., Feb. 1, 2016, httpJ/trade.ec.europa.eu/doclih/press/indexcfm?i
d=1437; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between Canada and the
European Union, Can.-E.U., Oct. 28, 2016, httpJ/ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/keta-
chapter-by-chapter/.
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agreements-many of which look alike, meaning that they share very
similar provisions. In this Part, I argue that consistency in trade
agreements has led to a trade law constitutionalization and to the
creation of a node-and-spoke regime. That regime is characterized by
constant motion. There are regular, analytic, diplomatic, and norm-
building engagements among the executives within the regime. Taken
together, the similarities across trade agreements create a web of what I
term "management opportunities" for the trade executive. For the
United States, the composition of the regime demonstrates that where
Congress delegated agreement-making authority under TPA, it
precipitated a highly-empowered executive.
A. The Replicated Institution
In fall 2015, the Obama Administration announced, together with
ministers from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Chile, Peru,
Singapore, Japan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and Mexico, the
completion of the largest agreement of this generation of U.S. trade
agreements: the TPP.
The road to the TPP was long, stretching across the whole of the
Obama Administration and earlier. 24 Its roots stretch even deeper to the
earliest U.S. FTAs. 25 It is precisely these clear roots that lead me to
term the collection of U.S. trade agreements concluded in the last
twenty years a "generation." 26 Substantively, these agreements have
24. The precursor to the TPP, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, was
initiated in 2003 by Singapore, New Zealand, and Chile. Brunei joined negotiations in
2005, and the partnership among those states came into force in 2006. In March 2008, the
United States joined the negotiations. See IAN F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG.
RESEARCH. SERV., R40502, THE TRANS-PAcIFIc PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 1, (2011). See
also Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Expanding the P-4 Trade Agreement into a Broader Trans-
Pacific Partnership: Implications, Risks and Opportunities, 4 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 401, 403-05 (2009). The TPP would not be the first major regional
trade agreement to fail, although it would be the most notable to fail at the legislative
level. The touted Free Trade Agreement of the Americas struggled to reach conclusion the
prior decade. See, eg., Larry Rohter, Bush Faces Tough Time in South America, N.Y.
TIMEs (Nov. 2, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/02/world/bush-faces-tough-time-in-
south-america.html.
25. Meredith Kolsky Lewis draws connections with an earlier Asia-Pacific agreement
but notes the U.S. position that TPP would be negotiated on U.S. terms, not building off
the Asia-Pacific agreement as a base. See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific
Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 27,
28-38 (2011).
26. Jagdish Bhagwati refers to a "second period of regionalism" that coincides with my
use of "generation." See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM 31-47
(2008); see also Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 39,
53-58 (2006) (referring to a wave of "Neo-Regionalism").
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many features in common, irrespective of their diverse foreign
representation. Procedurally, nearly all of these agreements were
negotiated between the branches through the joint congressional-
executive process known as fast track or TPA. Even reaching beyond the
United States, at the global level, the present generation of
international trade law instruments is characterized by the
proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements of like character,
enlarged scope, and common language. 27
The earliest bilateral trade agreements concluded through the TPA
process were the U.S.-Israel FTA (1985) and the U.S.-Canada FTA
(1988).28 Shortly thereafter, the latter was superseded by the passage
and implementation of the NAFTA (1993). Then, from 2001 through
2007, the United States concluded eight free trade agreements: the
U.S.-Singapore (2003), U.S.-Chile (2003), U.S.-Australia (2004), U.S.-
Morocco (2004), the Dominican Republic - Central America - United
States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) (2005), U.S.-Bahrain (2006),
U.S.-Oman (2006), and U.S.-Peru (2007). Only the U.S.-Jordan
agreement of 2001, negotiated by the Clinton Administration but
implemented by the George W. Bush Administration, was negotiated
and implemented without going through the TPA process. Three more
agreements negotiated through the TPA process were implemented in
2011: the U.S.-Panama, U.S.-Colombia, and U.S.-South Korea
agreements.29
Alongside the proliferation of agreements to other trading partners,
the content of U.S. agreements has expanded to cover subject areas
designed to harmonize regulatory frameworks and remove regulatory
barriers. The Colombia FTA, for example, has twenty-three chapters:
fifteen chapters address trade, investment, and other commercial
issues; six chapters address administrative issues; and two chapters
covering labor and the environment respectively. The thirty-chapter
27. This development is motivated in no small part by the failure to complete the WTO
rounds and the public backlash that dates back to WTO protests in Seattle in 1999. See,
e.g., Gregory Messenger, Anti-Fragmentation Strategies: The Curious Case of the EU and
World Trade Law, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.orglanti-fragmentation-
strategies-the-curious-case-of-the-eu-and-world-trade-lawl (describing how "institutional
deadlock at the WTO has led to a number of free trade agreements being concluded
globally"); Alex Tizon, Monday, Nov. 29, SEArrTLE TIMES (Dec. 5, 1999), httpJ/community.sea
ttletimes.nwsource.com/archivetdate-19991205&slug-2999667 (discussing the public response
to the WTO negotiations going on in Seattle that week).
28. I use FTA for all agreements to avoid confusion even though some agreements use
the title "Trade Promotion Agreement" which would also go by the initials TPA.
29. The negotiations toward their completion were begun and signed within the
timeframe set out by the 2002 TPA, which expired on July 1, 2007.
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TPP featured six new chapters covering areas of regulatory cooperation
and institutional accommodations.
Many provisions within the subject-specific chapters are nearly
identical from agreement to agreement. Looking at the TPP in
particular, there are large sections where the language remains the
same as the last trade agreement negotiated by the United States and
each of the agreements negotiated before that one. In other words, for
some chapters, the first draft template has been the only draft template.
The agreements and the institutions they establish have been replicated
multiple times over the last twenty years. Taken together, the
institutionalization of U.S. trade law extends beyond any single
agreement to create an entire regime or web of agreements through
which the U.S. regulatory apparatus navigates and enforces
international commitments.
One can anticipate a number of possible reasons for the consistency
in these agreements. The repeated use of standardized text in an
international agreement is not unique to the trade context. A model
agreement may be desirable whether for efficiency in negotiations,
consistency for civil servants and industry, or otherwise. But neither
Congress nor the executive appears to have sought to develop a formal
model or to have acknowledged that fact. A significant element of TPA
is its time-limited nature that requires reinstitution every few years.
Each TPA authorization has an end date, after which Congress has an
opportunity to reevaluate negotiating objectives. Even with these time-
bound opportunities, the substantive elements of TPA have perpetuated
a de facto model. The fact that the template has been recycled at the
negotiating table over the last twenty years suggests that, at a
minimum, foreign partners may perceive it to be the U.S. "model." 30
30. See Kolsky Lewis, supra note 24, at 32-33 (using the term "model"). The TPP early-
stage agreement already in place among the four states that preceded the United States to
the negotiating table was similar to NAFTA in many ways. For a description of some of
those similarities, see Make or Break: Obama Officials Start Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) Talks Today-First Obama Trade Deal?, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Mar. 15, 2010),
http://citizen.typepad.com/eyesontrade/2010/03/make-or-break-obama-officials-start-trans-
pacific-partnership-tpp-talks-today---first-obama-trade-deal.html [hereinafter Make or
Break]. According to David Gantz, the Singapore and Chile free trade agreements
effectively became models for the other FTAs. David Gantz, The "Bipartisan Trade Deal,"
Trade Promotion Authority and the Future of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 28 ST. LouIs U.
PUB. L. REV. 115, 122 (2008). Those, however, were based on and closely resemble the
NAFTA. See Frederick M. Abbott, A New Dominant Trade Species Emerges: Is
Bilateralism a Threat?, 10 J. INT'L EcoN. LAW 571, 578 (2007) (stating that "[w]hen the
United States or European Union tenders a draft PTA [preferential trade agreement] to a
developing country, it expects the basic template of its proposal to be followed, and in
some areas (such as investment rules or strengthening of IPRs protection), the
possibilities for effective counterproposal are almost non-existent"); GARY CLYDE
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In the course of the TPP negotiations, the "model" became a source
of considerable criticism. As the Obama Administration forged ahead
with TPP negotiations, Public Citizen claimed that "at issue is whether
the new administration will use the TPP process to translate Obama's
many specific campaign trade reform commitments into a new
approach-or whether the administration will fall back on the trade
agreement model used by the previous Bush, Clinton and Bush
administrations."3 1 Senator Bernie Sanders took the Senate floor in
2015 to express his view that "what we are discussing with the TPP is
not a new concept. . .. The truth is that we have seen this movie time
and time and time again. Let me tell my colleagues that the ending of
this movie is not very good. It is a pretty bad ending." 32 In 2016, both
the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates in the U.S.
presidential election took the position that the "model" was not working.
Both made strong comments in opposition to the TPP. In a speech in
August 2016, Secretary Hillary Clinton expressed her opposition in the
strongest terms to date: 'I will stop any trade deal that kills jobs or
holds down wages-including the Trans Pacific Partnership. I oppose it
now, I'll oppose it after the election, and I'll oppose it as president."33
Donald Trump reportedly referred to the TPP as a "disaster"3 4 and made
repeated claims that he would "renegotiate"3 5 the NAFTA. After the
election, President-Elect Donald Trump announced that "unsigning" the
TPP was among the action items he planned to pursue on his first day
in office.3 6 These statements further emphasized to the public and to
legislators the perceived failure of the "model" of the last twenty years.
But the TPP at the time of its finalization by the Obama
Administration ultimately was very similar to prior agreements, and,
like in those prior agreements, the parties were focused on more than
HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES
56-57 (2005) (noting that the NAFTA provisions have served as precedents for the later
FTAs and that successive agreements "have drawn heavily on their predecessors, with
NAFTA serving as the primary template").
31. Make or Break, supra note 30.
32. 161 CONG. REC. S2374, (daily ed. Apr. 23, 2015).
33. Jacob Pramuk, Clinton and Trump Can Agree on at Least One Thing, CNBC (Aug.
11, 2016, 4:26 PM), httpAvww.cnbc.com/2016/08/11/trump-and-clinton-now-sound-similar-on-one-
key-issue.html.
34. Id.
35. See Kristen Walker, Trump to Sign Executive Order on Plan to Renegotiate NAFTA
With Mexico, Canada, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2017, 7:49 AM), http/www.cnb.com/2017/0/23/trump-
to-sign-executierder-to-renegotiat-nafa-and-intent-to-leave-tpphbnl ("President Donald Trump is
expected to sign an executive order as early as Monday stating his intention to renegotiate
the free trade agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico .... .").
36. Trump Says US to Quit TPP on First Day in Office, BBC NEWS (Nov. 22, 2016),
http://www.bbc.comi/news/world-us-canada-38059623.
358
TRADING SPACES
just the flow of goods. Despite the lack of strong justifications for the
repetition and the recent backlash against it, the replication has led to
normative entrenchment and has created a web of international
commitments for executive bureaucrats to enforce.
B. How Free Trade Agreements as Institutions Empower the Executive
The newly constitutionalized trade law regime does far more than
reduce tariffs.37 These agreements take on added significance for
governance and foreign relations. Today's FTAs are more than just
multifunctional: they are law-creating, institution-building,
foundational administrative agreements through which the executive
creates new law by way of everyday engagements with foreign
governments.
Each of the subject-specific chapters of the modern bilateral or
multilateral trade agreement creates opportunities for interaction
between the two or more countries that are managed by executive
agencies. For example, take the CAFTA-DR Labor Chapter. This
chapter provides for each party's effective enforcement of its labor laws,
among other procedural guarantees the state must provide in respect of
internationally recognized labor principles. In Article 16.4, the chapter
creates a "Labor Affairs Council" comprised of "cabinet-level or
equivalent representatives of the Parties, or their designees." The
Council is intended to meet "to oversee the implementation of and
review progress under this Chapter," including additional institutional
arrangements set out in Article 16.5, and establishes "contact points" to
serve as channels for and of communication on labor-related matters.
Article 16.5 creates a "Labor Cooperation and Capacity Building
Mechanism." The Mechanism is a means through which the contact
points can build capacity related to labor issues. Specifically, Annex 16.5
provides that the Mechanism "may initiate bilateral or regional
cooperative activities on labor issues." In addition to these already
robust interactions, Article 16.6 also provides for cooperative labor
consultations to discuss any matter arising under the chapter, and,
under Article 16.7, the parties are obligated to work together to agree on
members for a labor roster. Through these several initiatives, the
executive entrenches its engagement with foreign partners. The same is
37. See, e.g., Federico Ortino, Regional Trade Agreements and Trade in Services
(providing an overview of the expansion of trade agreements), in BILATERAL AND
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES 213, 213-14 (Simon Lester et al. eds., 2d ed.
2015). The principle underlying the inclusion of topics such as environment and labor is
that lowering tariff and regulatory barriers could lead to a race to the bottom at the risk of
endangering internationally recognized labor and environmental standards.
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true for other chapters within the CAFTA-DR, and for other
agreements.
Thus, today's agreements are managerial trade agreements in at
least two respects. First, they manage relations between sovereigns at
the substantive and normative level. Second, they empower the
executive branch to take on managerial responsibilities in ways likely
unforeseen by the legislative branch, occasionally prompting legislators
to rein in their delegation. These agreements are both institution-
creating and institutions themselves that manage broad sectors of the
global economy, resulting from and contributing to international trade
law.
In addition to the regularly scheduled engagements between
executives, the executive also has broad authority to take enforcement
actions under the now several enforceable commitments the agreements
include. An additional important element of the dispute settlement
chapters of these trade agreements is their extension to matters on the
trade periphery, as I have termed it, allowing the executive to enforce
commitments related to labor and environment, for example. In the
newest trade agreements, nearly all the chapters are subject to dispute
settlement, meaning that one party can bring a case to enforce the
commitments in those chapters against the other party or parties.38 The
executive takes the decision on whether to bring such a case, manages
the submissions process and to some degree the rules and players, but,
importantly, it also delegates decision-making authority to an arbitral
panel. If the complaining party is successful, the agreement empowers
the executive to take binding trade-related action across a wide
spectrum of areas. These enforceable commitments further lend these
agreements to careful management and administration by the executive
and enable the executive to create new law through dispute settlement
panels. They have a continuous lawmaking effect.
Although an elaborate and delicate balance governs the making of
our trade agreements, the institutions that result provide the executive
with considerable latitude and additional tools in the everyday
management of U.S. trade relations. Although the executive once had a
reasonably minor role in foreign commerce, the executive currently
supervises and uses various procedural tools to enact more law. This is
38. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Republic of Korea, U.S.-Kor., ch.22, Mar. 15, 2012, https:/ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/korus-fta; United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement,
Colom.-U.S., ch. 21, Nov. 22, 2006, https-J/ustr.gov/sites/defaultfiles/uploadstagreementsltaWolomb
ia/assetjuploadfile227_10190.pdf Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free
Trade Agreement, Costa Rica-Dom. Rep.-El Sal.-Guat.-Nicar.-U.S., ch. 20, Aug. 5, 2004,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/caftalasset-uploadfile85_3940.pdf.
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described in greater detail in the next Part. The current literature has
not taken full note of the emergence and evolution of the managerial
U.S. trade law regime. Most studies of our foreign trade law view the
agreement-making process as the epiphenomenal result of a complex
executive-legislative architecture rather than as an institutionalization.
From treaties to agreements to institutions, the U.S. contribution to
international trade law has transformed.
III. QUOTIDIAN EXECUTIVE LAWMAKING
While the focus of the public eye has been on FTAs, they are not the
only instruments through which Congress and the executive make trade
law on behalf of the United States. This Part elaborates on the areas
through which the executive capitalizes on that institutional regime.
These moves implicate questions of delegation or perceived delegation
and executive exploitation of institutional openings. This Part also
introduces an additional area of U.S. trade lawmaking that has received
even less attention in the media and in scholarship.
The first way through which the U.S. executive maximizes its
delegated authority in the multilateral trading environment is through
its participation in the WTO. Most international law textbooks focus on
the workings of the WTO, but few contextualize the work of the
executive in that context. The WTO is not just a conglomeration of
international agreements making up fundamental free trade rules. It is
a highly complex secretariat with numerous committees on which
Members engage.
The WTO committees serve as fora for WTO members to air
grievances and make statements with respect to the regulatory
measures of other WTO members.39 They also provide an environment
through which WTO members can build cooperation and capacity in
areas relevant to trade.40 Officials from the U.S. executive actively
participate on behalf of the United States in these committees and
working groups just as executive branch officials represent the United
States in other international organizations. In the statements they
make, representatives of the United States at the WTO contribute to
normative development by reinforcing, reiterating, and introducing the
U.S. position on various, relevant international commitments. This
work arguably falls well within the president's foreign affairs power, but
39. For an overview of the committee structure and background, see Committees,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev2_e.htm (last
visited Feb. 26, 2017).
40. See id.
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it does so in a way that has a direct impact on the U.S. contribution to
multilateral trade law.
Another type of trade lawmaking occurs farther from the public eye:
bilateral subject-specific contracts between executive agencies on behalf
of their governments. Such quotidian instruments, as I call them
because of their frequent creation and use, which govern substantial
movements of goods and services have received little to no attention by
the public or by the scholarly community. Not only do these exchanges
of letters and other agreements move products, but they also constitute
international legal instruments that shape trade. International trade
lawmaking happens far more frequently through these inter-executive
handshakes-small-scale bilateral instruments concluded without
public scrutiny. These agreements fall under the authority of the USTR
and other agencies to negotiate.
The range of trade-related topic areas covered by these agreements
is vast. In agriculture, for example, quotidian trade contracts abound.
Trade in beef and beef products is one such area that has been the
subject of attention for informal lawmaking. A recent letter exchange
with Brazil provides an illustration: On August 1, 2016, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced that it had reached an
agreement with Brazil's Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food
Supply "to allow access for U.S. beef and beef products to the Brazilian
market for the first time since 2003." In a separate decision announced
in the same press release, the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection
Service (FSIS) determined that Brazil's food safety system governing
meat products is equivalent to that of the United States and that fresh
(chilled or frozen) beef can be safely imported from Brazil. According to
the announcement, the determination followed a multi-year, science-
based review consistent with U.S. food safety regulations. The result
was that FSIS amended the list of eligible countries and products
authorized for export to the United States to allow fresh (chilled or
frozen) beef from Brazil. Before that time, only cooked and canned beef
products could be imported from Brazil.
The announcement garnered considerable press in industry-specific
publications. Agriculture and beef media outlets commented on the
export potential and value of the beef market in South America for the
U.S. beef community: "U.S. beef/beef variety meat exports to South
America increased from just $6 million in 2003 to a record of $118.45
million in 2014, before slipping to $94.7 million in 2015."41 The
41. Joe Schuele, What to Expect When U.S.-Brazil Beef Trade Resumes, BEEF MAG.
(Sept. 8, 2016), http//www.beefmagazine.com/beef-exports/what-expect-when-us-brazil-beef-
trade-resumes. Brazilian Agriculture Minister Blairo Maggi said exports could begin in 90
days once paperwork was completed. He said an initial quota of 60,000 tons of Brazilian
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agreement was reached between the two countries following protracted
engagement between each country's executive branch representatives.
Brazilian Agriculture Minister Blairo Maggi came to Washington, DC,
to "nail down the agreement." 42 The "agreement" appears to have taken
the form of an exchange of letters. However, the letters are not readily
available to the public. They do not appear to have been reported to
Congress through the State Department as they are not available in the
State Department's collection.43 Unlike trade CEAs, these executive
exchanges are not always an accessible part of the public repertoire of
trade agreements.
Although Brazil is the world's largest beef exporter, it was not the
only country on the "target" list for an exchange of letters by the USDA.
In 2016 alone, these efforts have led to the reopening of the Saudi
Arabian and Peruvian markets for U.S. beef, the South Korean market
for U.S. poultry, and the South African market for U.S. poultry, pork,
and beef, to name a few. Take, for example, the letter exchange, similar
to .the Brazilian exchange, between Colombia and the United States
concluded in early 2016 that lifted restrictions previously placed on U.S.
beef products entering Colombia.44 In this exchange, the United States
and Colombia agreed to new requirements for approval of beef products
destined for Colombia. In total, between 2015 and 2016, the USDA and
USTR negotiated new beef access arrangements with sixteen countries,
gaining additional market access for U.S. beef in Colombia, Costa Rica,
Egypt, Guatemala, Iraq, Lebanon, Macau, New Zealand, Peru,
Philippines, Saint Lucia, Singapore, South Africa, Ukraine, Vietnam,
and, now, Brazil.
In many respects, the quotidian nature of these agreements counsel
in favor of executive prerogative to complete them without the
bureaucratic red tape that may come with inter-branch cooperation. It
makes sense that such agreements would not require substantial
congressional oversight or approval. Nevertheless, the content and
meaning of these agreements should not go unnoticed. As in the
example above, the opening of a previously restricted market for a major
beef should enter the United States in 2016. Anthony Boadle, U.S. Opens Up to Brazil
Fresh Beef Imports, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2016, 4:33 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
brazil-usa-beef-idUSKCN1OC358.
42. Boadle, supra note 41.
43. See Texts of International Agreements to Which the US Is a Party (TIAS), U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE https://www.state.gov/s/1/treaty/tias/index.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2017).
44. See Chris Gillis, U.S., Colombia Enhance Beef Trade, AM. SIPPER (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://www.americanshipper.com/Main/News/USColombia-enhance-beeftrade_62817.as
px#hide. The 2016 agreement is also not available to the public, although the 2006 prior
arrangement is available through the State Department collection.
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U.S. export such as beef is no small feat. Executive-led quotidian
agreements can have a major impact on the U.S. economy.
Note how some of these letters were concluded under the auspices of
an FTA regime. The agreement between Peru and the United States, for
example, includes at least three side letters available on the USTR
website in the area of agriculture that refer to the relationship created
under the FTA.45 The institutional framework established under the
agreement serves as the foundation through which the executive
authorities engage on product-specific binding arrangements.
Others of these seemingly small instruments govern far more than
beef. Similar exchanges to organize other agricultural issues are just
the tip of the iceberg. They extend to governance of procurement,
labeling, and a range of issues relevant to trade. Typically, however,
they address a discreet bilateral issue. They focus on a single industry
or issue between two partners. The 2005 Agreement in the Form of an
Exchange of Letters Between the United States of America and the
European Community on Matters Related to Trade in Wine uses the
term "agreement," even if it was conducted through an exchange of
letters as the title suggests. 46 The agreement amends and
operationalizes an agreement that the two countries concluded two
months earlier with initials.
On the topic of labeling, the USDA's organics arrangements are
representative of executive agreements taking on a nontraditional
agreement form. In the case of organics, the Congress passed The
Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA),47 which set up a National
Organic Program (NOP) to be administered by the USDA. The NOP
manages the U.S. organics production and sale regulations. These
regulations include rules regarding labeling as well as which products
may use the USDA organics label or sticker. The NOP also has a role in
upward and downward management of regulations related to organic
products. That is, the NOP oversees the interaction between the federal
organic program and the state organic programs.4 8 Likewise, the NOP,
45. See, e.g., Letter Exchange on Beef SPS Issues for United States-Peru Trade
Promotion Agreement, Peru-U.S., Oct. 6, 2006, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/October-
SPS-Exchange-of-Letters.pdf.
46. Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters Between the United States of
America and the European Community on Matters Related to Trade in Wine, E.U.-U.S.,
Nov. 23, 2005, https://www.ttb.gov/wine/wineagreement.pdf.
47. Title 21 of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (codified at 7
U.S.C. ch. 94, 7 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq.).
48. See U.S. DEP'T oF AGRic., NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM, STATE PROGRAms-PR1MLE,
httpJs/www.amsusdagov/stes/defaulfilestnedia/NOP/20State%20Programs/2Preamble.pdf ("The
Act provides that each State may implement an organic program for agricultural products
that have been produced and handled within the State, using organic methods that meet
364
TRADING SPACES
together with the USTR, facilitates the import and export of USDA
organics-labelled food.
At the international level, the USTR together with the NOP
concludes "organic arrangements" with other countries. Called "trade
and organics equivalency arrangements," the United States has
concluded them with Canada, the European Union, India, Israel, Japan,
New Zealand, Korea, Switzerland, and Taiwan to govern the import or
export of organic products from those countries. 49 For example, the
United States has an organic equivalence arrangement with Korea for
organic processed foods. This means that, as long as the terms of the
arrangement are met, certified organic operations in Korea or in the
United States may sell their products as organic in either country. The
equivalency arrangement that put this program into effect for Korea in
July 2014 exists in the form of an exchange of letters. The letters
provide, in relevant part:
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),
in coordination with the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), has reviewed the Republic of
Korea's program for certification of organic agricultural
products produced and handled in accordance with
Korea's Act on Promotion of Environmentally-friendly
Agriculture and Fisheries and Management and Support
for Organic Food (hereinafter "Korean Organic Food
Act") and its regulations. Based on that review, USDA
has determined pursuant to the Organic Foods
Production Act of 1990 (OFPA) (7 U.S.C. §§ 6501 et
seq.), under authority delegated to the Secretary of
Agriculture by the President, that certain processed food
products produced and handled in accordance with the
Korean Organic Food Act and its regulations, as in effect
on July 1, 2014, are produced and handled under an
organic certification program that provides
requirements and standards governing the production
and handling of such products that are at least
equivalent to the requirements of OPPA.
the requirements of the Act and these regulations. The Act further provides that a State
organic program (SOP) may contain more restrictive requirements for organic products
produced and handled within the State than are contained in the National Organic
Program (NOP). All SOP's and subsequent amendments thereto must be approved by the
Secretary.").
49. See International Trade Partners, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., https//www.ams.usda.gov/ser
vices/organic-certification/international-trade (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
365
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STuDIES 24:2
Accordingly, subject to the conditions set forth in
Appendix 1 of this letter, certain processed food products
produced and handled in conformity with the Korean
Organic Food Act and its regulations, as in effect on July
1, 2014, are deemed by the USDA to have been produced
and handled in accordance with the OFPA and the
USDA's organic regulations under the National Organic
Program (NOP) (7 CFR part 205). These products may
be sold, labeled, or represented in the United States as
organically produced, including by display of the USDA
organic seal as well as the organic seal of Korea's
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs
(MAFRA), under the conditions set forth in Appendix 1.
The United States is also pleased to acknowledge
Korea's recognition of the U.S. National Organic
Program in its letter of June 30, 2014. The USDA's
Agricultural Marketing Service and Foreign
Agricultural Service and USTR are committed to
working with Korea's MAFRA and Ministry of Trade,
Industry, and Energy to carry out the terms of the
determination as described in this cover letter and in
Appendix 1 and the arrangement regarding an Organics
Working Group described in Appendix 2.50
Thus, further to the congressional delegation, the executive executes
international trade-related agreements related to the flow of organic
products. No further congressional approval is required.
There are also other regimes that the U.S. executive has enacted to
maintain control over trade lawmaking. For example, over the last
twenty years, the United States has developed what I will term
"regional agreements-lite" in the form of what are known as "Trade and
Investment Framework Agreements" (TIFAs). According to the USTR,
these TIFAs "provide strategic frameworks and principles for dialogue
on trade and investment issues between the United States and the other
parties."5 1 They do not afford the trading partner all the benefits of the
50. Letter from Anne L. Alonzo, Administrator, Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S.
Department of Agriculture, & Sharon Bomer Lauritsen, Assistant U.S. Trade
Representative, Agricultural Affairs and Commodity Policy, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, to the Hon. Choi, Hee-jong, Deputy Minister for Food Industry Policy,
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, Republic of Korea (June 30, 2014)
(available at httpsJAvww.ams.usda.gov/sites/defaultiesmedia/NOP%/20Itter%/2to%2KDreapdf).
51. Trade & Investment Framework Agreements, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/trade-investment-framework-agreements (last visited
Apr. 23, 2017).
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model trade agreement discussed above, but they do afford the U.S.
executive a mechanism through which to consult with and, where
necessary, apply pressure to trade relationships with a view to
enhancing opportunities for trade and investment.
Some scholars have seen the use of the TIFA as a forerunner to a
full regional free trade agreement. Cherie O'Neal Taylor has written
that TIFAs have been used "sequentially to prepare a country or a
region for closer economic integration with the U.S. market. TIFAs are
used at the beginning of the process to set out the mutual goals of the
United States and its partner countries on trade and investment. If a
country is willing to make firm investment commitments, it then signs a
BIT [bilateral investment agreement] or agrees to such disciplines as
part of a free trade agreement." 52 While not always the case, TIFAs have
been used in this way. More important for the purpose of this Article is
that TIFAs provide a further executive-led regime for normative change
in international trade law.
Other "trade law" instruments concluded by the USTR include non-
enforceable jointly agreed action plans, memoranda of understanding,
and other multi-nominal documents concluded by U.S. executive
agencies in negotiation with foreign agencies.
For example, the USTR and the Colombia Ministry of Labor
concluded in 2011 a "Colombian Action Plan related to labor rights" as
an initiative to memorialize the countries' commitments to improving
the status of labor issues in Colombia despite the entry into force of the
U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement. 53 This initiative came from the
executive: "President Obama insisted that a number of serious and
immediate labor concerns be addressed before he would be willing to
send the Agreement to Congress. These concerns included violence
against Colombian labor union members; inadequate efforts to bring
perpetrators of murders of such persons to justice; and insufficient
protection of workers' rights in Colombia." 54 The result of that
engagement among the USTR, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL),
and the Colombian executive authorities was the Action Plan that
included major concrete steps for the Colombian government to take.
The USTR commented that successful key elements of the Action Plan
were a "precondition for the Agreement to enter into force."5 5 Since the
entry into force of the agreement, the USTR and the DOL have issued
52. C. O'Neal Taylor, Regionalism: The Second-Best Option?, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REv. 155, 161 (2008).
53. U.S.-Colombia Trade Agreement: Increasing American Competitiveness, U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE,. https://ustr.gov/uscolombiatpallabor (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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regular reports on the status of implementation of the Action Plan. In
each update, the executive agencies comment on the additional scrutiny
the conclusion of the Action Plan has provided them.
For the functioning of U.S. trade law, there is no shortage of
instruments regularly used by the executive. These quotidian
instruments, some of which grow out of the underlying congressionally
blessed institutional framework, and others of which do not, represent a
claimed competence that the U.S. executive has developed since the
Second World War. Most of the time, the executive refers back to the
constitutional or delegated authority through which it exercises its
prerogative. Where it does not, other elected officials or members of the
public may be surprised, and they may wish to revisit the delicate
balance of powers that holds U.S. trade lawmaking constant. That said,
in my view, these moves by the executive are not the result of its
intentional aggrandizement of authority, but rather, for the most part,
are the result of its maximizing empowerment legally delegated to it.
CONCLUSION
Although Congress seeks to rein in its delegated trade law
authorities,56 the existing tapestry of trade agreements and quotidian
arrangements afford the executive considerable managerial
responsibilities. As a result, micronormative movements in U.S. trade
law remain firmly within executive control. As this Article goes to press
on the dawn of the Trump Administration, the expanse of executive
authority in international trade may undergo a new round of testing.
One thing is certain: as President Trump seeks to make reforms he
discussed during his campaign, the environment is ripe for him to have
a major impact on U.S. management of its own trade law architecture,
trade flows, and the principles that make up international trade law.
56. Id.
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